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CIVIL PROCEDURE – FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order denying a motion for a preferential trial date in a 
corporation action.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying a motion for a 
preferential trial date because the Appellant brought it with over three months remaining in the 
five-year period. Moreover, the Appellant acted diligently in prosecuting the case. Accordingly, 
the Court reversed and remanded, granting Appellant three years from the date of filing the 
remittitur in district court to bring his case to trial. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
NRCP 41(e) provides that a district court shall dismiss an action that is not brought to 
trial within five years of the date on which the plaintiff filed the action, subject to stipulation by 
the parties.  
 
The parties met for a status conference in August 2007, with less than seven months 
remaining in the five-year period.  During the status conference, they stipulated to vacate the 
October 2007 trial date and stay all discovery and motion practice in anticipation of a settlement. 
The district court rescheduled the trial date for May 2008, after the five-year period expiration 
date. The five-year period was unmentioned in both the conference and the district court order 
for the new trial date. 
 
Afterward, Appellant was unable to obtain an agreement to extend the five-year period to 
the new trial date. In an attempt to preserve the case, Appellant filed two motions. The first 
motion requested the district court confirm that the status conference stayed the five-year period. 
The second motion asked the district court to grant a preferential trial date before the expiration 
of the five-year period. The district court denied the motion for preferential trial date without 
explanation. However, the court granted the motion staying the five-year period, concluding that 
the parties implicitly agreed to extend the five-year period by stipulating to a trial date past the 
expiration date. 
 
In March 2008, shortly after the five-year period expired, Respondent moved to dismiss the 
action for failing to bring the case to trial in time, pursuant to NRCP 41(e). Respondent argued 
that no mention of the five-year period was made during the parties’ status conference and, 
therefore, no stipulation was actually made. The district court granted the motion, finding its 
extension order based on an error of law, and dismissed the underlying case. This appeal 
followed. 
                                                          
1
 By Richard A. Andrews 
 Discussion 
 
 Justice Cherry wrote for the Court,
2
 noting that the plain language of NRCP 41(e) 
requires a written stipulation to extend the expiration date of the five-year period. An oral 
stipulation may qualify as written, but it must be made in open court, approved by the judge, 
entered into the minutes, and expressly mention the five-year period.
3
 Furthermore, the Court 
previously held that “words and conduct, short of a written stipulation’ cannot estop a defendant 
from seeking dismissal prior to the five-year rule.”4 Thus, the district court should have rejected 
the motion to confirm an implied waiver of the five-year period rule from the outset. 
  
The Court next turned its attention to the motion for a preferential trial date. The factors 
considered when evaluating such a motion are: (1) the time remaining in the five-year period 
when the motion is filed, and (2) the diligence of the moving party and his or her counsel in 
prosecuting the case.
5
 Applied to the case at hand, the Appellant filed the motion for a 
preferential trial date with more than three months remaining in the five-year period. 
Furthermore, Appellant diligently moved forward and actively pursued discovery. Finally, the 
record demonstrated that the underlying case “was never allowed to languish through prolonged 
periods of inactivity.” Thus, the district court should have granted the motion for a preferential 
trial date. 
  
The Court subsequently considered how much time Appellant should have to bring the 
case to trial on remand by examining two cases on the issue. In the first, McGinnis v. 
Consolidated Casinos Corp., the Court held that when a judgment entered before the end of trial 
is reversed on appeal, the parties, on remand, have three years from the date the remittitur is filed 
in district court to bring the case to trial.
7
 In the second case, Rickard v. Montgomery Ward & 
Co., the Court used a different rule, namely, that the appellant should be given “a reasonable 
period of time to set and bring his case to trial.”8 
  
Weighing the two cases, the Court favored the McGinnis rule because it provided the 
parties with certainty as to the remaining time to bring a case to trial. Furthermore, it offered 
more consistency because the Rickard rule of “a reasonable period” could vary based on 
jurisdiction as a result of the varied sizes of district courts’ dockets. Consequently, the Court 
overruled Rickard to the extent it is inconsistent with McGinnis’ conclusion. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 District courts, in evaluating a motion for a preferential trial date to avoid expiration 
under NRCP 41(e), must look at how much time is remaining in the five-year period and the 
diligence of the moving party to bring the case to trial. 
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 Justice Cherry was joined by Chief Justice Saitta and Justices Douglas, Gibbons, Hardesty, and Parraguirre. Justice 
Pickering dissented. 
3
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 Pursuant to the McGinnis rule, on remand, appellants have three years from the date they 
file the remittitur in district court to begin trial proceedings. Moreover, the Court overruled 
Rickard to the extent that is inconsistent with McGinnis.  
 
